The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is an organization for research, independent policy analysis, and public education in global environmental change. It seeks to provide leadership in understanding scientific, economic, and ecological aspects of this difficult issue, and combining them into policy assessments that serve the needs of ongoing national and international discussions. To this end, the Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from two established research centers at MIT: the Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers bridge many key areas of the needed intellectual work, and additional essential areas are covered by other MIT departments, by collaboration with the Ecosystems Center of the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole, and by short-and long-term visitors to the Program. The Program involves sponsorship and active participation by industry, government, and non-profit organizations.
INTRODUCTION
This policy note discusses projected GHG emissions paths that are potentially consistent with alternative targets for ultimately stabilizing the global climate system at lowest economic cost and under alternative scenarios for country participation in pricing regimes. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding future emissions paths, given that different models make very different assumptions about future emissions growth (in the absence of policy), the cost and availability of emissions-reducing technologies, and so on. Nonetheless, projections from the 2 models still provide decision makers with some broad sense of the appropriate scale of (near term and more distant) emissions prices that are consistent with alternative climate stabilization scenarios and how much these policies cost.
The next section discusses where we might be headed in the absence of mitigation policy, in terms of future GHG emissions trends, what these imply for the growth of atmospheric GHG concentrations and, ultimately, for the amount of likely warming over this century. We also discuss the benefits of different stabilization targets for atmospheric GHG accumulations in terms of potentially avoided warming. Section 3 discusses projected emissions pricing, and the costs of mitigation policies, to meet stabilization targets in the ideal (but unlikely) event of early and full global cooperation and with efficient pricing across all emissions sources and over time.
Section 4 discusses the implications of delayed emissions reductions by all countries, or just developing countries. Recent emissions reduction pledges by country governments are briefly evaluated in light of the climate stabilization goals. Section 5 discusses the distributional burden of mitigation costs across countries and the potential complications for negotiation of long-term climate policy. A final section offers some thoughts on pragmatic policy steps in the near term.
WHERE ARE WE HEADED IN THE ABSENCE OF CLIMATE POLICY?
Climate change may pose substantial risks to natural and human systems (IPCC, 2007) . In the absence of a policy that targets a reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, projected "likely" temperature increases by the end of the century are in the range of 2.4° -6.4°C above pre-industrial levels. The IPCC defines "likely" as a 66% chance or greater (IPCC, 2007) .
1 A recent MIT study with updated climate and socioeconomic parameters provide even higher values: a 90% range of 3.8° -7°C with a mean value of 5.2°C ).
There are many efforts to project future emissions trends and the range of projections over the 21 st century is wide. GDP and population growth are major determinants of emissions growth, while increases in energy efficiency (e.g., cars with an ability to drive longer distances per unit of fuel, or buildings that require less energy to heat them) and increasing costs of fossil fuels had the opposing effect on emissions. Most likely, economic growth will remain a major factor in driving up emissions, whereas the role of population will slowly fade over time as most population projections forecast a stabilization of the world population in the second half of the 3 21 st century. What differs most across forecasting models, hence causing the uncertainty affecting projections, are the assumptions concerning future GDP growth; the availability of fossil resources; the pace and direction of technical change, in turn affecting the cost of lowcarbon technologies and the energy intensity of the economy; and behavioral shifts, affecting energy demand. Whether or not the world undertakes significant policy directed toward reducing GHG emissions is an additional uncertainty on top of various economic forces that will play out over the century.
In the absence of a climate stabilization policy, energy-related CO 2 emissions (the primary GHG) are projected to increase substantially during the 21 st century. Figure 1 shows the range of projections in a recent model comparison exercise organized by Energy Modeling Forum, EMF 22 2 (Clarke et al, 2009) . 3 On average, fossil fuel CO 2 emissions grow from about 30 Gt (Gigatonne) CO 2 in 2000 to almost 100 Gt CO 2 by 2100.
The contribution of different regions to global emissions is more stable across models.
OECD countries contribute 15-25% to total emissions in 2100. The USA continues as one of the main emitters among the OECD countries. However, its projected global emissions share decreases from the current 25% to 10% by the end of the century. A major role of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries is foreseen, contributing by 2050 around 45-50% of total fossil CO 2 emissions. Consistently across models, at least 25% of the total emissions are attributed to China from 2020 onward. India, now accounting for 10% of global emissions, reaches on the order of 15% by mid-century. The rest of the developing world is projected to have an increasing role, moving from 17-25% of total emissions to 25-40%. The major sources of F-gases are air conditioning, semiconductor production, electrical switchgear, aluminum and magnesium production. Montreal Protocol, but that remain in the atmosphere as a powerful contribution to warming, and other short lived substances some of which are warming (e.g., ozone and particulates) and some cooling (e.g., sulfates). Prinn et al (2011) 
CLIMATE STABILIZATION WITH A GLOBAL PARTICIPATION OF COUNTRIES

Stabilization of GHG concentrations at levels often discussed in international negotiations
requires very substantial emissions cuts. Figure 3 illustrates the difficulty of reaching some proposed targets, as some stringent targets are already exceeded or will be exceeded in the notso-distant future. As can be seen, the world has already almost passed the often-discussed 450
CO 2 e target for the Kyoto Protocol gases 7 . Yet, what are the economic costs of achieving substantial reductions? These depend on who participates and the efficiency of the policies used to achieve reductions. We start by reporting the costs and consequences of climate stabilization assuming a so called "first-best" world, with full international participation, a perfect international carbon market including all GHGs and foresight of future climate obligations. In reality, departures from all or many of these assumptions are likely to occur and would result in potentially higher economic penalties and inefficiencies of various kinds. Nonetheless such an ideal case is useful to understanding the basic dynamics of the system, and to have a benchmark for the discussion of more realistic cases.
It is important to distinguish between who is incurring the cost of mitigation from who is actually implementing mitigating activities. For example, mitigation can happen in developing countries, but it can be financed with some offset scheme financed by developed countries.
Allocating internationally a given amount (typically determined by the stabilization target) of allowable emissions is going to affect the cost and who pays. This distributional issue would be extremely relevant both in the case of taxes and in that of permits. There are many ways to distribute the shares of emissions reduction among participating countries. One can propose reductions based on equal percent reduction, or GDP per capita, or population, or emissions intensity, or historical responsibility, or many other alternative ways. There is vast literature that analyzes these types of burden-sharing schemes. As any of the schemes benefit (or imposes the cost on) countries unevenly in different aspects of socio-economic indicators, there is no unique formula that would satisfy all participating countries. It is sometimes argued that in order to reach global economic efficiency (i.e., reaching a target at a lowest global economic cost), emissions should be priced at same rate across different countries. This can be achieved by imposing the same GHG price across the countries through a system of carbon taxes, or by allowing a full trade in emissions permits among all countries and all sectors of the economy 8 .
Emissions and Emissions Prices
Emission reductions and carbon prices results for the different models and under the different targets are reported in Table When considering the 450 ppm CO 2 e target only two models find a solution for the target when no overshoot is allowed; for these two models, the price is above 100 2005$/tCO2. When overshooting is considered, half of the models are able to find a solution with the price of carbon ranges between 15-263 2005$/tCO 2 . 8 Emissions trading may, for some countries, lead to a decrease in welfare (or total macroeconomic consumption) due to the terms-of-trade effect. For a discussion, see Babiker et al (2004) . A discussion of a similar potential welfare worsening in presence of externalities (e.g., energy taxes) can be found in Paltsev et al (2007) . 9 As we are reviewing the "first best" world we are assuming that all GHGs are taxed. Hence, we use the CO 2 equivalency to aggregate all GHGs.
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The reason why models are less capable of finding a feasible set of actions for more stringent targets resides in the fact that we are already very near to 450 ppm CO 2 e. Staying below 450 ppm CO 2 e would require an immediate and almost complete de-carbonization of the economy.
This, under realistic assumptions, is likely to be technically unfeasible. Similarly, going back to the target after overshooting implies large deployment of negative emissions technologies. Not all models envision the deployment of technologies enabling us to remove CO 2 from the atmosphere (for example, biomass power generation coupled with CO 2 capture and storage).
These technologies deployed at a massive scale would allow bringing down concentrations emission pathways later in the century 10 .
As the "first best" assumption allows for the full trading in emissions permits, the 2020 carbon price will increase over time at a discount rate because of perfect substitutability of trading in emissions permits and other financial instruments. Different modeling groups assume different discount rates, usually in the range of 3-5%, so the carbon price would also increase over time at the same rate.
Looking at emission reductions needed to be in line with the different targets (first and second column in Table 1 ) it is important to notice that, for the near-and medium-term, there is not much difference in appropriate emission prices for 550 and 650 ppm-but very large emission reductions are required, even in the short run for the 450 ppm CO 2 e scenario.
Policy Costs
The carbon price might be a misleading indicator for the economic cost of climate policy as it does not univocally translate in macroeconomic or welfare impacts. (For a detailed discussion, see, for example, Appendix B in Paltsev et al, 2009) . Indeed economists usually measure the cost in terms of welfare loss (or loss in consumption measured as equivalent variation, that roughly can be interpreted as the macroeconomic combination of the cost of producing with more efficient technologies, or cleaner but more expensive fuels, the forgone benefits to households from cutting back on energy use, etc.). GDP loss is another popular measure for the cost of a 10 Currently, these negative carbon technologies are highly speculative. For a discussion concerning the potential role of bioenergy and carbon capture and storage technologies on the costs of stringent policy see Tavoni and Tol (2010) . For a discussion about potential technological and economic obstacles for air capture technologies see Ranjan (2010) .
policy, as many of the models used for climate policy analysis do not report welfare 11 . Most of the studies focus on emissions mitigation costs as climate benefits and potential ancillary nonclimate benefits of GHG mitigation are much more uncertain. Emissions pricing will induce emissions reductions in the sectors where these reductions are cheapest. Models have different views about the timing of emissions reduction, but most of the projections agree that the power generation sector will be the first area where less-carbonemitting (e.g., natural gas) or almost-zero-carbon-emitting technologies (e.g., nuclear, hydro, renewables) are introduced because of various economic substitutes that already exist in this sector 12 . Less-emitting technologies in transportation (e.g., gasoline/electric hybrid vehicles, more fuel efficient conventional vehicles) and energy-saving technologies in buildings and industry are also promising, but currently look more expensive. Substantial reductions in GHG emissions in agriculture and cement production are also costly, but to achieve climate stabilization, emissions from all sectors of the economy need to be reduced drastically. For more stringent climate stabilization targets, the reductions are needed to begin in the near future, and if the models are correct, some very ambitious targets (i.e., 450 ppm CO 2 e) might be already out of reach. Previous economic analyses have estimated that there may be significant and relatively inexpensive and cost effective opportunities for protecting and enhancing global forest carbon stocks. Linking REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) could be extremely beneficial as it is a low cost carbon abatement opportunity, although several implementation issues would need to be overcome. Deforestation mitigation could lower the total costs of climate stabilization policies by around 10-25% depending on the policy scenario, and could enable additional reductions of about 20 ppm CO 2 e with no added costs compared to an energy-sector only policy (Bosetti et al, 2011) . However, most of rainforest countries have not yet developed the implementation capacity for monitoring and enforcing country scale projects and this might diminish the role of REDD in the next decade.
EMF
Deferring the bulk of mitigation action to later periods can make sense if we are optimistic about the availability, cost and speed of deployment of low-emissions technologies. A further degree of freedom is represented by negative emissions technologies. However, relying on a technological future which might not evolve as expected comes at a risk of missing the target completely.
INCOMPLETE PARTICIPATION AND DELAYED ACTION
Carbon prices as well as mitigation costs depend critically on assumptions about
(1) innovation and the availability of low-carbon alternatives to conventional fossil fuels, (2) flexibility of substitution within the energy-economic system, (3) the credibility of future policies that triggers long term investments and (4) the immediate action of all countries or of major emitters. In this section we investigate the latter crucial assumption and how it might influence results presented so far.
For a given stabilization target, delayed global action implies a higher post peak reduction rate. Short term inaction would then result in a required pace of de-carbonization so rapid that replacement of capital would need to be abrupt and very costly. Only under the optimistic assumption of large-scale CO 2 removal, the tradeoff between costs and timing of action can be less severe. If the world continues according to business-as-usual until 2030, stabilization at 550 ppm CO 2 e will no longer be possible, according to most models. The target might still be feasible if ambitious mitigation policies at global scale are postponed until 2020, but this delay could substantially scale up global mitigation cost. Climate policy aiming at 450 ppm CO 2 e target leaves even less leeway for a delay of cooperative mitigation action (Edenhofer et al, 2009 ).
Rather than complete global inaction, more likely we will face asymmetry of actions across world regions. Significant mitigation actions are planned to take place in some developed countries within the next decade (e.g., the EU has committed to the 20% reduction below 1990 levels target by 2020). However, it is unlikely that emerging economies will make substantial emissions reductions in the coming decade. This asymmetric participation will most likely increase the global costs of those stabilization scenarios that remain feasible; some of the more stringent targets may not be feasible.
Inaction in developing countries clashes with the fact that the bulk of emissions in the next decades will be coming from non-OECD countries. If CO 2 emissions are not regulated in some major emitting countries, two inefficiencies arise: (1) static inefficiency, as mitigation does not take place where mitigation costs are lowest, and (2) More generally, the set of technologies that will be available and the speed at which they will be deployed significantly affect not only the costs of any climate policy, but also the time we can wait without entering an irreversible path. The stricter the climate objective or the later the mitigation effort starts, the more we will need to resort to technologies which have potential implications that we have not yet fully understood. This obviously requires a careful and realistic Emission pathways consistent with a "likely" chance of meeting the 2°C limit generally peak before 2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO 2 e (range: 39-44 GtCO 2 e), have steep emission reductions afterwards and/or reach negative emissions in the longer term. Hence, the ranges implied by Copenhagen pledges do not necessarily rule out the 2°C target, as the two ranges are not severely distant from one another. However, as previously discussed, the larger the overshoot will be, the faster the de-carbonization in the second half of the century will be needed, with all the implications that we have discussed above.
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The consideration that the 2° C target could be out of reach should not be a reason for inaction. Even limited actions towards reducing GHG concentrations result in a substantial reduction in risk of exceeding a certain temperature threshold. et al, 2009) illustrates the benefits of at least some mitigation actions in comparison to the noaction scenario. For example, stabilization at 800 ppm reduces the probability of exceeding 4°C in 2100 to 7% from 85% in the no-policy scenario. Therefore, even a limited action directed at GHG reductions by a subset of regions will appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme levels of temperature increase. 
WHO BEARS THE COSTS OF ABATEMENT?
As discussed in the previous section, the current state of climate negotiations does not give high hopes for universal participation. When regions or economic sectors are excluded, the costs of meeting the global target are higher in participating countries for any given emission target.
When policy instruments deviate from an idealized economy-wide GHG tax or pricing, the costs of meeting a target also increase substantially. (For a discussion when GHG pricing or cap-andtrade system is replaced with renewable energy requirements, see, for example, Morris et al, 2010 .) Absent near universal participation, stringent climate stabilization goals are quite costly or not achievable, because economic activity and emissions would shift to nations that do not sign the agreement 16 . Even with all nations taking on commitments, the policies would require a complex system of financial transfers to simultaneously satisfy widely-discussed burden-sharing goals. Ultimately, differences in the costs of abatement between countries will depend on their energy, industrial and agricultural systems (that would determine marginal costs of abatement in the sectors), emissions allocations, policy instruments, and financial transfers.
Two interacting equity concerns would have to be dealt with in seeking the global emissions goal. First, incentives and compensation for developing country participation will be required, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Second, since mitigation costs and compensation payments by developed countries will be substantial, they also will need to find an acceptable burden-sharing arrangement among themselves. Simple emissions reduction rules are incapable of dealing with the highly varying circumstances of different countries.
Successful climate negotiations will need to be grounded in a full understanding of the substantial amounts at stake. With less than full compensation the welfare burden on developing countries would rise, but the international financial transfers would remain at unprecedented scale. It is an extreme assumption that developing countries will demand complete compensation. If, as is likely, they are willing to bear some costs, then the welfare burden on the developed countries will be reduced. Also, the burden is lowered somewhat if compensation only covers direct mitigation costs and not other losses associated with the policy, as might come through terms-of-trade effects. In the process the required financial transfers are reduced as well, but they remain large 18 .
In general, the cost of mitigation is higher in energy-exporting countries, while energyimporters have some counter-effects in terms-of-trade due to lower fossil fuel prices that allow them to reduce the cost of participation. The welfare costs can be both substantial and wildly different across regions depending on the allocation methods and policy instruments chosen 19 .
What makes matters worse is that climate change related damages vary wildly as well but in a very different way, adding up to the complexity of the problem. For success in dealing with the climate threat, any negotiation of long-term goals and paths to achievement need to be grounded in a full understanding of the substantial amounts at stake.
CONCLUSION
Without significant emissions mitigation action, the likely atmospheric temperature increase is projected to range between 2.5° and 6°C by the end of the century. The risks associated with temperature increases above 2°C are not fully understood. Existing scientific knowledge justifies at least slowing down the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. To reduce the cost while achieving an equitable sharing of them, decisions about where emissions reductions are taken and how they are paid for should be separated. Emission mitigation should take place where it is most efficient. Innovation, both on energy efficiency and 18 In this case the annual financial transfers to developing countries are lower by $77 billion in 2020 and by $108 billion in 2050 . 19 Higher the deviation from the "first-best" instruments (such as universal carbon taxes), the larger the costs. alternative energy sources, is needed. Carbon pricing (e.g., carbon taxes or a price established through a cap and trade system) would provide a signal to trigger both innovation and adoption of technologies needed for a low carbon economy.
Advocates of rapid climate stabilization might be dismayed by some of the harsh technical, economic, and practical realities discussed above. Keeping mean projected warming above preindustrial levels to 2.0 o C, or stabilizing atmospheric GHGs at 450 ppm (about current levels), would require rapid widespread international adoption of emissions control policies, and the development, and global deployment, of negative emission technologies later in the century to reverse atmospheric accumulations, after a period of overshooting the long-term concentration target. Even the 550 ppm target (mean projected warming of 2.9 o C), is extremely challenging, not least because required emissions prices escalate rapidly with further significant delay in controlling global GHGs, and the annual transfers to provide some compensation for developing countries are large and contentious to design. On the other hand, near-term emissions prices that are consistent with the 650 ppm target are more moderate, and delayed action on emissions reductions is less serious for this case, though obviously this target entails greater risks of dangerous warming.
The huge uncertainties-surrounding both the extent of climate change associated with a given atmospheric concentration target, and our ability to develop technologies that would enable a rapid stabilization of the climate if the earth warms up rapidly-point to the importance of putting a policy architecture in place in the near term, and delaying decisions about how rapidly emissions should be scaled back in the distant future until some of the uncertainties have been resolved. 
